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Summary
The impact on spending by government and employers  
has been a major issue in the current health reform debate. 
In this brief, we estimate the cost and coverage implications 
of the key provisions of the bill passed by the House of 
Representatives in November 2009. 
Currently, the medical needs of uninsured people put 
significant strain on the health care system because, 
even without insurance coverage, they receive billions 
of dollars worth of “uncompensated” care—medical care 
that is either freely donated by providers or results in an 
unpaid bill. Under the House reform bill, we estimate that 
34 million fewer people would be uninsured. The cost 
of uncompensated care provided to the uninsured in a 
single year would decrease from $61 billion to $25 billion. 
Assuming that about three-quarters of uncompensated care 
is financed by federal, state and local governments (through 
Medicare and Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital 
payments and other provisions), we estimate that the $89 
billion increase in government costs in a single year (due 
to the expansion of Medicaid and subsidies to employers 
and individuals) could be significantly offset, by perhaps 
as much as $27 billion due to decreased spending on 
uncompensated care. 
We estimate that the change in employer’s net costs under 
the House reform bill would be relatively modest—an 
increase of just 2.9 percent over the current system. 
Moreover, spending differs by firm size, with higher 
spending among larger firms and lower spending among 
smaller firms. The increase in costs for larger firms 
primarily reflects increased enrollment in existing employer 
coverage that will occur because of the individual mandate. 
Among small employers, we estimate that net costs would 
decrease due to a combination of factors, including 
employer subsidies, the introduction of health insurance 
exchanges as a more efficient vehicle for small group 
coverage, the expansion of Medicaid coverage to some 
low-income employees, and exemptions from penalties for 
not offering health insurance coverage. Thus, the House bill 
would reduce the disadvantages that small firms currently 
face in providing health insurance to their employees, a key 
objective of reform.
The Senate bill passed in December 2009 has many 
similarities to the House bill. However employers who do 
not offer coverage would be subject to lower assessments, 
and the expansion of Medicaid and premium and cost-
sharing subsidies for lower income exchange enrollees are 
both lower compared to the House bill. On net, the costs 
of large and small employers and of government would be 
lower under the Senate bill, while costs for lower income 
families would be higher due to less coverage and lower 
subsidies. And while the Senate bill appears to allow for 
greater reductions in DSH allotments, more uninsured are 
likely to remain compared to the House bill, which could 
mean a greater burden of uncompensated care.
Introduction
During the debate over health care 
reform, the cost of health insurance for 
smaller employers has been a particular 
concern, since they are currently at a 
significant disadvantage in purchasing 
coverage for employees compared to 
larger firms.1 Compared to larger firms, 
smaller firms face higher administrative 
loads on small-group insurance 
products, have a much greater variance 
in health insurance premiums, and tend 
to have lower wage workers who benefit 
less, on average, from the exclusion 
of employer-sponsored insurance 
premiums from taxable wages. As a 
result, smaller employers are currently 
much less likely to purchase insurance 
on behalf of their employees, and  
their employees are more likely to  
be uninsured. A key objective of the 
House bill is to reduce the disadvantages 
that small employers currently face  
in providing health insurance to  
their employees.
The United States now spends 
considerable sums on the medical 
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needs of the uninsured. This spending 
puts significant strain on the health 
care system because the uninsured 
receive billions of dollars worth of 
“uncompensated” care—medical 
care that is either freely donated by 
providers or results in an unpaid bill. 
Hadley et al. (2008) estimated that in 
2008 the uninsured received about 
$56 billion in uncompensated care 
during the time they lacked insurance 
coverage.2 The government paid 
the lion’s share of this bill—about 
$43 billion—through Medicare and 
Medicaid Disproportionate Share 
Hospital (DSH) payments, graduate 
medical education payments, various 
other federal programs, and state and 
local tax appropriations. To the extent 
that uninsured people gain insurance 
coverage under reform, these resources 
could be redirected, for example, 
towards offsetting government costs. 
In this brief, we compare the 
distribution of health care spending in 
the current system to spending under 
reform, in particular looking at how 
spending would change for employers 
of different sizes, government, families, 
and uncompensated care. We focus 
this analysis on the bill passed by the 
House of Representatives on November 
7, 2009, using a microsimulation 
model to estimate cost and coverage 
implications of the key provisions of 
the Affordable Health Care for America 
Act (H.R. 3962).3 Results suggest that 
reform would lead to lower costs for 
small firms while expanding coverage 
among employees and their dependents. 
In addition, we find that savings from 
decreases in uncompensated care 
under reform could provide significant 
spending offsets for federal and state 
governments. In the discussion section, 
we suggest how the results could differ 
under the proposed Senate bill.
Methods
To evaluate how health spending 
would shift across sectors under health 
reform, we use the Urban Institute’s 
Health Insurance Policy Simulation 
Model (HIPSM).4 HIPSM simulates the 
decisions of businesses and individuals 
in response to policy changes, such 
as Medicaid expansions, new health 
insurance options, subsidies for 
the purchase of health insurance, 
and insurance market reforms. The 
model provides estimates of changes 
in government and private costs, 
premiums, rates of employer offers of 
coverage, and health insurance coverage 
resulting from specified reforms.5 
The reforms are modeled as if the 
policy had been fully implemented in 
2009. With some simplifications, the 
model captures the basic elements of 
the comprehensive reforms specified in 
the House bill related to the coverage 
choices of nonelderly Americans. These 
elements include the following:
• A Medicaid expansion of eligibility 
to all those with incomes up to 150 
percent of the federal poverty level 
(FPL).6 
• An individual mandate with a penalty 
for remaining uninsured, with 
exemptions for individuals and families 
with incomes below the tax filing 
threshold and for financial hardship.7 
• A requirement for employers with 
annual payrolls of more than $750,000 
to offer coverage or pay an assessment 
equal to 8 percent of wages. The 
assessment for those not offering 
coverage phases out for firms with 
lower payrolls; those with annual 
payrolls of less than $500,000 would 
be exempt.8 
• A new health insurance exchange 
(“the exchange”) offering plans 
constructed to meet actuarial value 
standards of 70 percent.9 Exchange 
plan premiums would be age rated 
using 2:1 age bands, meaning the 
oldest purchasers (64 year olds) 
could be charged premiums up to 
two times as high as the youngest 
adult purchasers.10 Exchange-based 
insurance coverage would be available 
to individuals and families purchasing 
nongroup coverage independent of an 
employer and to small employers.11 
• Refundable premium tax credits 
(“premium subsidies”) available to 
eligible families purchasing insurance 
through the exchange. The premium 
subsidies would be provided on a 
sliding scale basis. These subsidies 
would limit the maximum percentage 
of income that a family would have 
to spend on its health insurance 
premium to 1.5 percent of income 
for those at 133 percent of the FPL, 
phasing up to 12 percent of income 
for those at 400 percent of the FPL.12 
• Cost-sharing subsidies available to 
eligible families purchasing insurance 
through the exchange. Cost-sharing 
subsidies would decrease household 
out-of-pocket medical costs by 
effectively increasing the actuarial 
value of the basic exchange plan. 
The subsidy would decrease as 
income increases, and no cost-sharing 
subsidies would be available to those 
above 350 percent of the FPL.13 
• All health plans offered in the 
exchange would be required to set out-
of-pocket maximums no higher than 
$5,000/individual and $10,000/family 
to satisfy the coverage requirement.14 
• Employees of firms that offer coverage 
would be ineligible for subsidized 
coverage in the exchange unless the 
employee’s share of the employer-
based coverage premium exceeded  
12 percent of income.
• A small employer tax credit 
(“employer subsidies”) for firms that 
offer health insurance and have 25  
or fewer employees with average 
wages of less than $40,000. The tax 
credit would be available for up to 
2 years, and would cover up to 50 
percent of the employer’s share of 
the premium for the lowest wage 
employees in the smallest firms. The 
credit phases out for higher-wage 
employees and larger firms.15
We assume that under full 
implementation of reform, state 
eligibility for public insurance would 
be maintained at current Medicaid and 
CHIP eligibility levels. If states scale 
back eligibility for public insurance, 
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overall coverage under reform could 
be substantially lower, which could 
change the distribution of health care 
spending across sectors. We account 
for DSH payments as a component of 
uncompensated care spending, rather 
than in a separate government cost line, 
because DSH payments help fund the 
cost of uncompensated care provided 
by hospitals. Budgeted reductions 
in DSH payments under reform are 
reflected as reduced uncompensated 
care spending. Except for individual 
and employer assessments related 
to coverage requirements, financing 
provisions of the House bill are beyond 
the scope of this analysis.16 We make 
several additional simplifications that 
we believe are not likely to substantially 
affect our overall findings.17 
Results 
Table 1 shows the change in the 
distribution of health insurance 
coverage that would result from the 
House bill. We estimate that the number 
of uninsured would fall from 49.1 
million to 15.1 million—a decrease of 
12.7 percentage points or 69.3 percent. 
The main source of coverage for the 
nonelderly population would continue 
to be through employer-sponsored 
plans. More than half (56.5 percent) of 
the nonelderly population, 151 million 
people, currently have health insurance 
coverage through employer-sponsored 
plans. Including employer-sponsored 
coverage through the exchange, this 
figure would increase on net by 4.8 
million people to 155.8 million (58.3 
percent of the nonelderly population). 
The expansion in coverage among small 
firm employees is significant—the 14.4 
million enrolling in small firm coverage 
through the exchange would more 
than offset decreases in traditional 
(non-exchange) employer coverage.18 
Medicaid/CHIP coverage would increase 
from 42.9 million to 65.1 million people, 
reflecting the expansion of Medicaid to 
150 percent of the FPL—a significant 
expansion in eligibility for many states. 
Many with nongroup coverage or who 
were uninsured at baseline would 
switch to coverage in the nongroup 
exchange, which would cover 22.7 
million people. 
Table 2 presents baseline nonelderly 
spending and changes in spending 
for government, employers by size, 
families by income, and uncompensated 
care. Health system spending for the 
nonelderly would increase by 8.0 
percent, or $83.2 billion, under the 
House bill if fully implemented in 2009. 
Although this analysis focuses on the 
nonelderly, it is important to note that 
the net increase in health care spending 
will be far less when the elderly are 
included, since spending on the elderly 
would decline relative to baseline. For 
example, estimates from the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 
predict that overall national health 
expenditures (NHE) under the House 
bill would increase by only about 
0.8 percent over the ten-year period 
2010-2019, reflecting the net impact 
of coverage expansions and savings 
provisions in Medicare and Medicaid. 
This translates into a modest increase 
Table 1.  Health Insurance Coverage Distribution of Nonelderly in Baseline and Reform
Baseline
Affordable Health Care  
for America Act  
(H.R. 3962)
Difference Relative  
to Baseline
Coverage Millions % Millions % Millions % Point  Difference*
Employer (Excluding Exchange) 151.0 56.5% 141.4 52.9% -9.6 -3.6%
Employer Exchange 0.0 0.0% 14.4 5.4% 14.4 5.4%
Nongroup (Excluding Exchange) 15.7 5.9% 0.0 0.0% -15.7 -5.9%
Nongroup Exchange 0.0 0.0% 22.7 8.5% 22.7 8.5%
Medicaid/CHIP 42.9 16.1% 65.1 24.4% 22.2 8.3%
Other (including Medicare) 8.4 3.2% 8.4 3.2% 0.0 0.0%
Uninsured 49.1 18.4% 15.1 5.6% -34.0 -12.7%
*Percentage point difference in coverage rate compared to baseline.
Note: Reforms are modeled as if they were fully implemented in 2009, and estimates are for that single year.
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2009.
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Table 2.  Health Care Spending of Government, Uncompensated Care, Employers, and Families for Nonelderly  
in Baseline and Reform
Baseline
Affordable Health Care  
for America Act  
(H.R. 3962)
Difference Relative to Baseline
Billions Billions Billions %
Total Government Spending (Federal + State)
Medicaid/CHIP $246.8 $308.9 $62.0 25.1%
Exchange Cost-sharing Subsidies $0.0 $6.4 $6.4 —
Exchange Premium Subsidies $0.0 $25.5 $25.5 —
Employer Subsidies (<25 Employees) $0.0 $6.7 $6.7 —
Individual Mandate Penalties $0.0 $4.0 $4.0 —
Employer Assessments $0.0 $7.3 $7.3 —
Net Government Spending $246.8 $336.2 $89.4 36.2%
Uncompensated Care Spending
$61.1 $25.2 -$35.9 -58.7%
Employer Spending by Firm Size*
<50  Employees $84.4 $77.4 -$6.9 -8.2%
50–499  Employees $90.0 $97.8 $7.8 8.7%
>500 Employees  $238.2 $249.2 $11.0 4.6%
Net Employer Spending $412.6 $424.4 $11.8 2.9%
Individual and Family Spending by Income as a % of the FPL**
<150% FPL $32.0 $16.1 -$15.9 -49.7%
150–199% FPL $13.8 $14.5 $0.7 4.9%
200–399% FPL $81.8 $95.2 $13.4 16.4%
>= 400% FPL $187.4 $207.1 $19.7 10.5%
Net Individual and Family Spending $315.0 $332.9 $17.9 5.7%
Total Nonelderly Health Care Spending $1035.5 $1118.7 $83.2 8.0%
*Employer spending includes premium contributions and employer assessments, less employer subsidies.
**Individual and family spending includes premiums plus out-of-pocket health care spending, less premium and cost-sharing subsidies, or individual mandate penalties. For an individual in 2009,  
150% of the FPL is $16,245, 200% of the FPL is $21,660, and 400% of the FPL is $43,320. For a family of four in 2009, 150% of the FPL is $33,075, 200% of the FPL is $44,100,  
and 400% of the FPL is $88,200. Http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/09poverty.shtml. 
Note: Table shows spending for nonelderly people only. Reforms are modeled as if they were fully implemented in 2009, and estimates are for that single year.
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2009.
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in NHE as a share of gross domestic 
product (GDP) of 0.3 percentage points 
in 2019 under the House bill, compared 
to baseline projections.19 
Turning back to the spending of the 
nonelderly under the House bill, 
government costs would increase by 
$89.4 billion, largely due to increases 
in Medicaid/CHIP enrollment, which 
would add $62.0 billion to government 
costs. Premium and cost sharing 
subsidies for families purchasing 
insurance through the exchange 
would cost the government $25.5 
billion and $6.4 billion, respectively. 
Employer subsidies (for those with 
fewer than 25 employees) would cost 
the government an additional $6.7 
billion. These government costs would 
be offset to a small extent by revenue 
collected under the individual mandate 
penalties and employer assessments, 
which would total $4.0 billion and $7.3 
billion, respectively. Due to the large 
estimated decrease in the number of 
uninsured under reform, the total cost 
of uncompensated care provided to the 
uninsured would decrease 58.7 percent, 
from $61.1 billion to $25.2 billion. 
Estimated employer spending in the 
baseline and under reform is also 
shown in Table 2. Net employer 
costs associated with contributions 
to heath insurance premiums and 
assessments would increase by 2.9 
percent of employer spending ($11.8 
billion), reflecting the increase in 
employer-based coverage that would 
result from the reforms.20 However, 
the change in spending relative to 
baseline would differ by employer size, 
with higher net costs for larger firms 
(50 or more employees) but lower net 
costs for smaller firms (fewer than 50 
employees). Compared to spending at 
the baseline, the net decrease in smaller 
firm spending of 8.2 percent (–$6.9 
billion) under the House bill reveals 
the combined effects of the small 
employer subsidies, broad exemptions 
from the employer assessment, and 
lower administrative loads experienced 
by firms that would switch from 
non-exchange to exchange based 
coverage. These effects would more 
than outweigh increases in cost due 
to increased enrollment in employer 
coverage and any assessments that 
would be paid by small firms.21 Even 
without the small employer subsidy, 
smaller firms would spend slightly less 
on health care after reform compared to 
baseline. Larger firms would experience 
net increases in costs, due to increased 
enrollment in employer coverage and 
the assessments that some firms would 
face for not offering coverage.
Net individual costs would increase 
5.7 percent ($17.9 billion) under 
reform, as millions of people who were 
uninsured at baseline would enroll in 
private coverage, making contributions 
through premiums and cost sharing to 
the cost of their health care. Spending 
among those with incomes less than 
150 percent of the FPL would decrease 
49.7 percent ($15.9 billion) as those who 
would newly enroll in Medicaid would 
gain access to comprehensive benefits 
with only nominal out-of-pocket costs. 
Income-related subsidies would hold 
costs relatively steady (an increase of 4.9 
percent or $0.7 billion) for those with 
incomes between 150 and 199 percent 
of the FPL, providing new coverage for 
some while helping others to maintain 
coverage. However, those with incomes 
between 200 and 399 percent of the FPL 
would experience a net increase in cost 
of 16.4 percent over baseline spending 
($13.4 billion), as many uninsured 
gain coverage and would have to pay 
for much of it since subsidies would 
phase down at these income levels. 
Large numbers of people in this income 
range would see reductions in costs.22 
Above 400 percent of the FPL, relative 
increases in costs would be somewhat 
lower than those with slightly less 
income, as most people in this income 
range have private coverage prior to 
reform and would continue to have 
coverage under reform.
Discussion
Due to the estimated drop in the 
number of uninsured from 49.1 million 
to 15.1 million under the House 
health care reform bill, the total cost 
of uncompensated care provided to 
the uninsured in a single year would 
decrease from $61.1 billion to $25.2 
billion. Hadley et al. (2008) suggest that 
about three-quarters of uncompensated 
care is financed by federal, state and local 
governments, through DSH payments 
and other provisions.23 If so, the $89.4 
billion estimated annual increase in 
government costs under the house bill 
could be significantly offset, by perhaps 
as much as $27 billion, due to decreased 
spending on uncompensated care. 
The House bill specifies some 
reductions in the uncompensated care 
costs financed through DSH payments.24 
Although some uncompensated care 
burdens would persist due to those 
remaining uninsured under reform, 
the savings due to the reduction in 
demand for safety net services would 
leave more in government funds that 
could be redirected to pay for health 
care reform. Those who provide care 
for the uninsured—primarily hospitals 
that now receive the largest subsidies 
for uncompensated care—may be 
reluctant to allow their existing subsides 
to decrease, particularly if they are 
unsure whether an increase in their 
reimbursements due to the increase in 
health insurance coverage would be 
fully compensatory. On the other hand, 
the estimated $83.2 billion net increase 
in total health spending under reform 
suggests that many providers stand to 
gain from reform. 
The Chamber of Commerce claims 
that under a health care reform 
bill, all employers—including small 
businesses—would be required to 
provide extensive health benefits 
or pay a penalty of 8 percent of 
payroll.25 However, the House bill has 
exemptions, tax credits and other 
provisions that would protect the vast 
majority of small employers; similar 
provisions exist in the Senate bill.26 
Contrary to the fears of some in the 
business community, we estimate that 
the impact of health reform under 
the House bill on employer’s net costs 
would be relatively modest—an increase 
of just 2.9 percent over the current 
system. Moreover, spending differs 
by firm size, with higher spending 
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among larger firms and lower spending 
among smaller firms. The increase in 
costs for larger firms primarily reflects 
increased enrollment in existing 
employer coverage that will occur 
because of the individual mandate. For 
small firms, we estimate that net costs 
would decrease due to a combination of 
factors, including employer subsidies, 
the introduction of health insurance 
exchanges as a more efficient vehicle for 
small group coverage, the expansion of 
Medicaid coverage to some low-income  
employees, and little in the way of 
applicable penalties for not offering 
health insurance coverage to their workers. 
On December 24, 2009, the Senate 
passed a health care reform bill with 
similar provisions to the House bill.27 
However, important differences exist. 
Under the Senate bill, employers who do 
not offer coverage would be subject to 
lower assessments, and the expansion 
of Medicaid and premium and cost-
sharing subsidies for lower income 
exchange enrollees are both lower 
compared to the House bill. On net, the 
costs of large and small employers and 
of government would be lower under 
the Senate bill, while costs for lower 
income families would be higher due 
to less coverage and lower subsidies. 
And while the Senate bill appears to 
allow for greater reductions in DSH 
allotments, more uninsured are likely 
to remain compared to the House bill, 
which could mean a greater burden of 
uncompensated care.
In broad terms, both the Senate and 
House bills would counteract the 
projected increase in the number of 
uninsured Americans by expanding 
public insurance for the lowest income 
families, increase affordability and 
access for millions of employees and 
others, and decrease financial pressures 
on the hospitals and clinics that provide 
care to the uninsured. Policymakers 
should also consider the budgetary 
benefits of reduced uncompensated  
care costs. These funds, if redirected 
fully, could, for example, be used to 
increase premium and cost-sharing 
subsidies in the exchange, further 
reducing family financial burdens. 
These are important considerations, 
since public support for health reform is 
related to the extent to which employers 
and families consider the costs they face 
to be affordable and fair.
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puting eligibility for the subsidy is complex due 
to the creation, destruction, and growth of small 
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beyond the scope of this paper. 
16   For example, we do not model the income  
surtax. However, the overall effect of this tax  
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employees are in firms that pay an assessment 
(data not shown.)
22   For analysis of how the levels of premium and 
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how affordable insurance coverage would be for 
families under reform proposed in the House and 
Senate, see Bowen Garrett, Lisa Clemans-Cope, and 
Matthew Buettgens, “Premium and Cost-Sharing 
Subsidies under Health Reform: Implications for 
Coverage, Costs, and Affordability,” December 
2009. The Urban Institute. http://www.urban.org/
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23   Hadley et al. (2008).
24   For example, decreases in Medicaid DSH alloca-
tions of $1.5 billion in 2017, $2.5 billion in 2018, 
and $6 billion in 2019. In addition, the House 
bill gives the Secretary the discretion to reduce 
Medicare DSH allocations based on reductions in 
the rate of uninsurance. These reductions in DSH 
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government costs under the House bill. 
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smallbusinessnation.com, accessed January 14, 
2010: “Under the new bill, businesses will be 
required to provide a government-mandated level 
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26   See Linda J. Blumberg and Stacey McMorrow, 
“What Would Health Care Reform Mean for 
Small Employers and Their Workers?” December 
16, 2009, The Urban Institute, http://www.rwjf.
org/healthreform/product.jsp?id=53272. While 
the Senate bill passed on December 24, 2009 
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28   Small employers who currently offer coverage 
to employees with higher than average costs 
may also fear the proposed excise tax on high-
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insurance exchange, an advantage for high cost 
firms. In addition, those with premiums in excess 
of an excise tax threshold that wish to continue 
to provide coverage to their workers outside of 
the exchange could restructure benefits to avoid 
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